Social and Political Thought |
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is one of the greatest systematic thinkers in
the history of Western philosophy. In addition to epitomizing German idealist
philosophy, Hegel boldly claimed that his own system of philosophy represented an
historical culmination of all previous philosophical thought. Hegel's overall
encyclopedic system is divided into the science of Logic, the philosophy of
Nature, and the philosophy of Spirit. Of most enduring interest are his views on
history, society, and the state, which fall within the realm of Objective Spirit.
Some have considered Hegel to be a nationalistic apologist for the Prussian
State of the early 19th century, but his significance has been much
broader, and there is no doubt that Hegel himself considered his work to be an
expression of the self-consciousness of the World Spirit of his time. At the
core of Hegel's social and political thought are the concepts of freedom, reason,
self-consciousness, and recognition. There are important connections between the
metaphysical or speculative articulation of these ideas and their application to
social and political reality, and one could say that the full meaning of these
ideas can be grasped only with a comprehension of their social and historical
embodiment. The work that explicates this concretizing of ideas, and which has
perhaps stimulated as much controversy as interest, is the Philosophy
of Right (Philosophie des Rechts), which will be a main focus of this
essay.
Table of Contents (Clicking on the links below will take you to that part of this article)
G.W.F. Hegel was born in Stuttgart in 1770, the son of an official in the government of the Duke of Württemberg. He was educated at the Royal Highschool in Stuttgart from 1777-88 and steeped in both the classics and the literature of the European Enlightenment. In October, 1788 Hegel began studies at a theological seminary in Tübingen, the Tüberger Stift, where he became friends with the poet Hölderlin and philosopher Friedrich Schelling, both of whom would later become famous. In 1790 Hegel received an M.A. degree, one year after the fall of the Bastille in France, an event welcomed by these young idealistic students. Shortly after graduation, Hegel took a post as tutor to a wealthy Swiss family in Berne from 1793-96. In 1797, with the help of his friend Hölderlin, Hegel moved to Frankfurt to take on another tutorship. During this time he wrote unpublished essays on religion which display a certain radical tendency of thought in his critique of orthodox religion.
In January 1801, two years after the death of his father, Hegel finished with tutoring and went to Jena where he took a position as Privatdozent (unsalaried lecturer) at the University of Jena, where Hegel's friend Schelling had already held a university professorship for three years. There Hegel collaborated with Schelling on a Critical Journal of Philosophy (Kritisches Journal der Philosophie) and he also published a piece on the differences between the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling (Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems der Philosophie) in which preference was consistently expressed for the latter thinker. After having attained a professorship in 1805, Hegel published his first major work, the Phenomenology of Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes, 1807) which was delivered to the publisher just at the time of the occupation of Jena by Napoleon's armies. With the closing of the University, due to the victory of the French in Prussia, Hegel had to seek employment elsewhere and so he took a job as editor of a newspaper in Bamberg, Bavaria in 1807 (Die Bamberger Zeitung) followed by a move to Nuremberg in 1808 where Hegel became headmaster of a preparatory school (Gymnasium), roughly equivalent to a high school, and also taught philosophy to the students there until 1816. During this time Hegel married, had children, and published his Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik) in three volumes.
One year following the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo (1815), Hegel took the
position of Professor of Philosophy at the University of Heidelberg where he
published his first edition of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences
in Outline (Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im
Grundrisse, 1817). In 1818 he became Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Berlin, through the invitation of the Prussion minister von
Altenstein (who had introduced many liberal reforms in Prussia until the fall of
Napoleon), and Hegel taught there until he died in 1831. Hegel lectured on
various topics in philosophy, most notably on history, art, religion, and the
history of philosophy and he became quite famous and influential. He held public
positions as a member of the Royal Examination Commission of the Province of
Brandenberg and also as a councellor in the Ministry of Education. In 1821 he
published the Philosophy of Right (Philosophie des Rechts) and in
1830 was given the honor of being elected Rector of the University. On November
14, 1831 Hegel died of cholera in Berlin, four months after having been decorated
by Friedrich Wilhelm III of Prussia.
Political Writings
Apart from his philosophical works on history, society, and the state, Hegel
wrote several political tracts most of which were not published in his lifetime
but which are significant enough in connection to the theoretical writings to
deserve some mention. (These are published in English translation in Hegel's
Political Writings and Political Writings, listed in the bibliography
of works by Hegel below.) Hegel's very first political work was on "On the Recent Domestic
Affairs of Wurtemberg" (Über die neuesten innern Verhältnisse
Württembergs
, 1798) which was neither completed nor published. In
it Hegel expresses the view that the constitutional structure of Wurtemberg
requires fundamental reform. He condemns the absolutist rule of Duke Ferdinand
along with the narrow traditionalism and legal positivism of his officials and
welcomes the convening of the Estates Assembly, while disagreeing with the method
of election in the Diet. In contrast to the existing system of oligarchic
privilege, Hegel argues that the Diet needs to be based on popular election
through local town councils, although this should not be done by granting
suffrage to an uneducated multitude. The essay ends inconclusively on the
appropriate method of political representation. A quite long piece of about 100 pages, The German Constitution (Die
Verfassung Deutchlands) was written and revised by Hegel between 1799 and
1802 and was not published until after his death in 1893. This piece provides an
analysis and critique of the constitution of the German Empire with the main
theme being that the Empire is a thing of the past and that appeals for a unified
German state are anachronistic. Hegel finds a certain hypocrisy in German
thinking about the Empire and a gap between theory and practice in the German
constitution. Germany was no longer a state governed by law but rather a
plurality of independent political entities with disparate practices. Hegel
stresses the need to recognize that the realities of the modern state necessitate
a strong public authority along with a populace that is free and unregimented.
The principle of government in the modern world is constitutional monarchy, the
potentialities of which can be seen in Austria and Prussia. Hegel ends the essay
on an uncertain note with the idea that Germany as a whole could be saved only
by some Machiavellian genius. The essay "Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of
Württemberg, 1815-1816" was published in 1817 in the Heidelbergische
Jahrbücher. In it Hegel commented on sections of the official report of
the Diet of Württemberg, focusing on the opposition by the Estates to the
King's request for ratification of a new constitutional charter that recognized
recent liberalizing changes and reforms. Hegel sided with King Frederick and
criticized the Estates as being reactionary in their appeal to old customary laws
and feudal property rights. There has been controversy over whether Hegel here
was trying to gain favor with the King in order to attain a government position.
However, Hegel's favoring a sovereign kingdom of Wurtemberg over the
German Empire and the need for a constitutional charter that is more rational
than the previous are quite continuous with the previous essays. A genuine state
needs a strong and effective central public authority, and in resisting the
Estates are trying to live in the feudal past. Moreover, Hegel is not uncritical
of the King's constitutional provisions and finds deficiencies in the exclusion
of members of professions from the Estates Assembly as well as in the proposal
for direct suffrage in representation, which treats citizens like unintegrated
atomic units rather than as members of a political community. The last of Hegel's political tracts, "The English Reform Bill," was written
in installments in 1831 for the ministerial newspaper, the Preussische
Staatszeitung, but was interrupted due to censure by the Prussian King
because of the perception of its being overly critical and anti-English. As a
result, the remainder of the work was printed independently and distributed
discretely. Hegel's main line of criticism is that the proposed English reforms
of suffrage will not make much of a difference in the distribution of political
power and may only create a power struggle between the rising group of
politicians and the traditional ruling class. Moreover, there are deep problems
in English society that cannot be addressed by the proposed electoral reforms,
including political corruption in the English burroughs, the selling of seats in
parliament, and the general oligarchic nature of social reality including the
wide disparities between wealth and poverty, Ecclesiastical patronage, and conditions
in Ireland. While Hegel supports the idea of reform with its appeal to rational
change as against the "positivity" of customary law, traditionalism and
privilege, he thinks that universalizing suffrage with a property qualification
without a thorough reform of the system of Common Law and the existing social
conditions will only be perceived as token measures leading to greater
disenchantment among the newly enfranchised and possibly inclinations to violent
revolution. Hegel claims that national pride keeps the English from studying and
following the reforms of the European Continent or seriously reflecting upon and
grasping the nature of government and legislation. There are several overall themes that reoccur in these political writings and
that connect with some of the main lines of thought in Hegel's theoretical works.
First, there is the contrast between the attitude of legal positivism and the
appeal to the law of reason. Hegel consistently displays a "political
rationalism" which attacks old concepts and attitudes that no longer apply to the
modern world. Old constitutions stemming from the Feudal era are a confused
mixture of customary laws and special privileges that must give way to the
constitutional reforms of the new social and political world that has arrived in
the aftermath of the French Revolution. Second, reforms of old constitutions
must be thorough and radical, but also cautious and gradual. This might sound
somewhat inconsistent, but for Hegel a reform is radical due to a fundamental
change in direction, not the speed of such change. Hegel suggests that customary
institutions not be abolished too quickly for there must be some congruence and
continuity with the existing social conditions. Hegel rejects violent popular
action and sees the principal force for reform in governments and the estates
assemblies, and he thinks reforms should always stress legal equality and the
public welfare. Third, Hegel emphasizes the need for a strong central
government, albeit without complete centralized control of public administration
and social relations. Hegel here anticipates his later conception of civil
society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft), the social realm of individual
autonomy where there is significant local self-governance. The task of
government is not to thoroughly bureaucratize civil society but rather to provide
oversight, regulation, and when necessary intervention. Fourth, Hegel claims
that representation of the people must be popular but not atomistic. The
democratic element in a state is not its sole feature and it must be
institutionalized in a rational manner. Hegel rejects universal suffrage as
irrational because it provides no means of mediation between the individual and
the state as a whole. Hegel believed that the masses lacked the experience and
political education to be directly involved in national elections and policy
matters and that direct suffrage leads to electoral indifference and apathy.
Fifth, while acknowledging the importance of a division of powers in the public
authority, Hegel does not appeal to a conception of separation and balance of
powers. He views the estates assemblies, which safeguard freedom, as essentially
related to the monarch and also stresses the role of civil servants and members
of the professions, both in ministerial positions and in the assemblies. The
monarchy, however, is the central supporting element in the constitutional
structure because the monarch is invested with the sovereignty of the state.
However, the power of the monarch is not despotical for he exercises authority
through universal laws and statutes and is advised and assisted by a ministry and
civil service, all members of which must meet educational requirements.
The Jena Writings (1802-06)
Hegel wrote several pieces while at the University of Jena that point in the
direction of some of the main theses of the Philosophy of Right. The
first was entitled "On the Scientific Modes of Treatment of Natural LawIts
Place in Practical Philosophy and Its Relationship to the Positive Science of
Law" (Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des
Naturrechts
), published originally in the Kritisches Journal der
Philosophie in 1802, edited jointly by Hegel and Schelling. In this piece,
usually referred to as the essay on Natural Law, Hegel criticizes both the
empirical and formal approaches to natural law, as exemplified in British and
Kantian philosophy respectively. Empiricism reaches conclusions that are limited
by the particularities of its contexts and materials and thus cannot provide
universally valid propositions regarding the concepts of various social and
political institutions or of the relation of reflective consciousness to social
and political experience. Formalist conclusions, on the other hand, are too
insubstantial and abstract in failing to properly link human reason concretely to
human experience. Traditional natural law theories are based on an abstract
rationalism and the attempts of Rousseau, Kant, and Fichte to remedy this through
their various ethical conceptions fail to overcome abstractness. For Hegel, the
proper method of philosophical science must link concretely the development of
the human mind and its rational powers to actual experience. Moreover, the
concept of a social and political community must transcend the instrumentalizing
of the state. Hegel's work entitled "The System of Ethical Life" (System der
Sittlichkeit) was written in 1802-03 and first published in its entirety by
Georg Lasson in 1913 in a volume entitled Schriften zur Politik und
Rechtsphilosophie. In this work, Hegel develops a philosophical theory of
social and political development that correlates with the self-development of
essential human powers. Historically, humans begin in an immediate relation to
nature and their social existence takes the form of natürliche
Sittlichkeit, i.e., a non-selfconscious relation to nature and to others.
However, the satisfaction of human desires leads to their reproduction and
multiplication and leads to the necessity for labor, which induces transformation
in the human world and people's connections to it. This process leads to a
self-realization that undermines the original naïve unity with nature and
others and to the formation of overtly cooperative endeavors, e.g., in the making
and use of tools. Another result of labor is the emergence of private property
as an embodiment of human personality as well as of sets of legal relationships
that institutionalize property ownership, exchange, etc., and deal with crimes
against property. Furthermore, disparities in property and power lead to
relationships of subordination and the use of the labor of others to satisfy
one's increasingly complex and expanded desires. Gradually, a system of mutual
dependence, a "system of needs," develops, and along with the increasing
division of labor there also develops class differentiations reflecting the types
of labor or activity taken up by members of each class, which Hegel classifies
into the agricultural, acquisitive, and administerial classes. However, despite
relations of interdependence and cooperation the members of society experience
social connections as a sort of blind fate without some larger system of control
which is provided by the state which regulates the economic life of society. The
details of the structure of the state are unclear in this essay, but what is
clear is that for Hegel the state provides an increased rationality to social
practices, much in the sense that the later German sociologist Max Weber
(1864-1920) would articulate how social practices become more rational by
being codified and made more predictable. The manuscripts entitled Realphilosophie are based on lectures Hegel
delivered at Jena University in 1803-04 (Realphilosophie I) and 1805-06
(Realphilosophie II), and were originally published by Johannes
Hoffmeister in 1932. These writings cover much of the same ground as the
System der Sittlichkeit in explicating a philosophy of mind and human
experience in relation to human social and political development. Some of the
noteworthy ideas in these writings are the role and significance of language for
social consciousness, for giving expression to a people (Volk) and for the
comprehending of and mastery of the world, and the necessity and consequences of
the fragmentation of primordial social relationships and patterns as part of the
process of human development. Also, there is a reiteration of the importance of
property relations as crucial to social recognition and how there would be no
security of property or recognition of property rights if society were to remain
a mere multitude of families. Such security requires a system of control over
the "struggle for recognition" through interpersonal norms, rules, and juridical
authority provided by the nation state. Moreover, Hegel repeats the need for
strong state regulation of the economy, which if left to its own workings is
blind to the needs of the social community. The economy, especially through the
division of labor, produces fragmentation and diminishment of human life (compare
Marx on alienation) and the state must not only address this phenomenon but also
provide the means for the people's political participation to further the
development of social self-consciousness. In all of this Hegel appears to be
providing a philosophical account of modern developments both in terms of the
tensions and conflicts that are new to modernity as well as in the progressive
movements of reform found under the influence of Napoleon. Finally, Hegel also discusses the forms of government, the three main types
being tyranny, democracy, and hereditary monarchy. Tyranny is found typically in
primitive or undeveloped states, democracy exists in states where there is the
realization of individual identity but no split between the public and private
person, and hereditary monarchy is the appropriate form of political authority in
the modern world in providing strong central government along with a system of
indirect representation through Estates. The relation of religion to the state
is undeveloped in these writings, but Hegel is clear about the supereminent role
of the state that stands above all else in giving expression to the Spirit
(Geist) of a society in a sort of earthly kingdom of God, the realization
of God in the world. True religion complements and supports this realization and
thus cannot properly have supremacy over or be opposed to the state.
The Phenomenology of Spirit
The Phenomenology of Spirit (Die Phänomenologie des
Geistes), published in 1807, is Hegel's first major comprehensive
philosophical work. Originally intended to be the first part of his
comprehensive system of science (Wissenschaft) or philosophy, Hegel
eventually considered it to be the introduction to his system. This work
provides what can be called a "biography of spirit," i.e., an account of the
development of consciousness and self-consciousness in the context of some
central epistemological, anthropological and cultural themes of human history.
It has continuity with the works discussed above in examining the development of
the human mind in relation to human experience but is more wide-ranging in also
addressing fundamental questions about the meaning of perceiving, knowing, and
other cognitive activities as well as of the nature of reason and reality. Given
the focus of this essay, the themes of the Phenomenology to be
discussed here are those directly relevant to Hegel's social and political
thought. One of the most widely discussed places in the Phenomenology is the
chapter on "The Truth of Self-Certainty" which includes a subsection on
"Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage." This
section treats of the (somewhat misleadingly named) "master/slave" struggle which
is taken by some, especially the Marxian-inspired, as a paradigm of all forms of
social conflict, in particular the struggle between social classes. It is clear
that Hegel intended the scenario to typify certain features of the struggle for
recognition (Anerkennung) overall, be it social, personal, etc. The
conflict between master and slave (which shall be referred to hereafter as lord and
bondsman as more in keeping with Hegel's own terminology and the intended generic
meaning) is one in which the historical themes of dominance and obedience,
dependence and independence, etc., are philosophically introduced. Although this
specific dialectic of struggle occurs only at the earliest stages of
self-consciousness, it nonetheless sets up the main problematic for achieving
realized self-consciousnessthe gaining of self-recognition through the
recognition of and by another, through mutual recognition. According to Hegel, the relationship between self and otherness is the
fundamental defining characteristic of human awareness and activity, being rooted
as it is in the emotion of desire for objects as well as in the estrangement from
those objects, which is part of the primordial human experience of the world. The
otherness that consciousness experiences as a barrier to its goal is the external
reality of the natural and social world, which prevents individual consciousness
from becoming free and independent. However, that otherness cannot be abolished
or destroyed, without destroying oneself, and so ideally there must be
reconciliation between self and other such that consciousness can "universalize"
itself through the other. In the relation of dominance and subservience between
two consciousnesses, say lord and bondsman, the basic problem for consciousness
is the overcoming of its otherness, or put positively, the achieving of
integration with itself. The relation between lord and bondsman leads to a sort
of provisional, incomplete resolution of the struggle for recognition between
distinct consciousnesses. Hegel asks us to consider how a struggle between two distinct consciousnesses,
let us say a violent "life-or-death" struggle, would lead to one consciousness
surrendering and submitting to the other out of fear of death. Initially, the
consciousness that becomes lord or master proves its freedom through willingness
to risk its life and not submit to the other out of fear of death, and thus not
identify simply with its desire for life and physical being. Moreover, this
consciousness is given acknowledgement of its freedom through the submission and
dependence of the other, which turns out paradoxically to be a deficient
recognition in that the dominant one fails to see a reflection of itself in the
subservient one. Adequate recognition requires a mirroring of the self through
the other, which means that to be successful it must be mutual. In the ensuing
relationship of lordship and bondage, furthermore, the bondsman through work and
discipline (motivated by fear of dying at the hands of the master or lord)
transforms his subservience into a mastery over his environment, and thus
achieves a measure of independence. In objectifying himself in his environment
through his labor the bondsman in effect realizes himself, with his transformed
environment serving as a reflection of his inherently self-realizing activity.
Thus, the bondsman gains a measure of independence in his subjugation out of fear
of death. In a way, the lord represents death as the absolute subjugator, since
it is through fear of this master, of the death that he can impose, that the
bondsman in his acquiescence and subservience is placed into a social context of
work and discipline. Yet despite, or more properly, because of this subjection
the bondsman is able to attain a measure of independence by internalizing and
overcoming those limitations which must be dealt with if he is to produce
efficiently. However, this accomplishment, the self-determination of the
bondsman, is limited and incomplete because of the asymmetry that remains in his
relation to the lord. Self-consciousness is still fragmented, i.e., the
objectification through labor that the bondsman experiences does not coincide
with the consciousness of the lord whose sense of self is not through labor but
through power over the bondsman and enjoyment of the fruits of the bondsman's
labor. Only in a realm of ethical life can self-determination be fully
self-conscious to the extent that universal freedom is reflected in the life of
each individual member of society. Thus, in the Phenomenology consciousness must move on through the
phases of Stoicism, Skepticism, and the Unhappy Consciousness before engaging in
the self-articulation of Reason, and it is not until the section "Objective
Spirit: The Ethical Order" that the full universalization of self-consciousness
is in principle to be met with. Here we find a shape of human existence where
all men work freely, serving the needs of the whole community rather than of
masters, and subject only to the "discipline of reason." This mode of ethical
life, typified in ancient Greek democracy, also eventually disintegrates, as is
expressed in the conflict between human and divine law and the tragic fate that
is the outcome of this conflict illustrated in the story of Antigone. However,
the ethical life described here is still in its immediacy and is therefore at a
level of abstractness that falls short of the mediation of subjectivity and
universality which is provided spiritually in revealed Christianity and
politically in the modern state, which purportedly provides a solution to human
conflict arising from the struggle for recognition. In any case, the rest of the
Phenomenology is devoted to examinations of culture (including
enlightenment and revolution), morality, religion, and finally, Absolute
Knowing. The dialectic of self-determination is, for Hegel, inherent in the very
structure of freedom, and is the defining feature of Spirit (Geist). The
full actualization of Spirit in the human community requires the progressive
development of individuality which effectively begins with the realization in
self-consciousness of the "truth of self-certainty" and culminates in the shape
of a shared common life in an integrated community of love and Reason, based upon
the realization of truths of incarnation, death, resurrection, and forgiveness as
grasped in speculative Religion. The articulation Hegel provides in the
Phenomenology, however, is very generic and is to be made concrete
politically with the working out of a specific conception of the modern
nation-state with its particular configuration of social and political
institutions. It is to the latter that we must turn in order to see how these
fundamental dialectical considerations take shape in the "solution" to the
struggle for recognition in self-consciousness. However, before moving directly
to Hegel's theory of the state, and history, some discussion of his Logic
is in order.
Logic and Political Theory
The Logic constitutes the first part of Hegel's philosophical system as
presented in his Encyclopedia. It was preceded by his larger work, The
Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik), published in 1812-16 in
two volumes. The "Encyclopedia Logic" is a shorter version intended to function
as part of an "outline," but it became longer in the course of the three
published versions of 1817, 1827, and 1830. Also, the English translation by
William Wallace contains additions from the notes of students who heard Hegel's
lectures on this subject. (Reference to the paragraphs of the Encyclopedia
will be made with the "¶" character.) The structure of the Logic is triadic, reflecting the organization of
the larger system of philosophy as well as a variety of other motifs, both
internal and external to the Logic proper. The Logic has three
divisions: the Doctrine of Being, the Doctrine of Essence, and the Doctrine of
the Notion (or Concept). There are a number of logical categories in this work
that are directly relevant to social and political theorizing. In the Doctrine
of Being, for example, Hegel explains the concept of "being-for-self" as the
function of self-relatedness in the resolving of opposition between self and
other in the "ideality of the finite" (¶ 95-96). He claims that the task of
philosophy is to bring out the ideality of the finite, and as will be seen later
Hegel's philosophy of the state is intended to articulate the ideality of the
state, i.e., its affirmative and infinite or rational features. In the Doctrine
of Essence, Hegel explains the categories of actuality and freedom. He says that
actuality is the unity of "essence and existence" (¶ 142) and argues that
this does not rule out the actuality of ideas for they become actual by being
realized in external existence. Hegel will have related points to make about the
actuality of the idea of the state in society and history. Also, he defines
freedom not in terms of contingency or lack of determination, as is popular, but
rather as the "truth of necessity," i.e., freedom presupposes necessity in the
sense that reciprocal action and reaction provide a structure for free action,
e.g., a necessary relation between crime and punishment. The Doctrine of the Notion (Begriff) is perhaps the most relevant
section of the Logic to social and political theory due to its focus on
the various dynamics of development. This section is subdivided into three
parts: the subjective notion, the objective notion, and the idea which
articulates the unity of subjective and objective. The first part, the
subjective notion, contains three "moments" or functional parts: universality,
particularity, and individuality (¶ 163ff). These are particularly
important as Hegel will show how the functional parts of the state operate
according to a progressive "dialectical" movement from the first to the third
moments and how the state as a whole, as a functioning and integrated totality,
gives expression to the concept of individuality (in ¶198 Hegel refers to
the state as "a system of three syllogisms"). Hegel treats these relationships
as logical judgments and syllogisms but they do not merely articulate how the
mind must operate (subjectivity) but also explain actual relationships in reality
(objectivity). In objective reality we find these logical/dialectical
relationships in mechanism, chemism, and teleology. Finally, in the Idea, the
correspondence of the notion or concept with objective reality, we have the truth of
objects or objects as they ought to be, i.e., as they correspond to their
proper concepts. The logical articulation of the Idea is very important to
Hegel's explanation of the Idea of the state in modern history, for this provides
the principles of rationality that guide the development of Spirit in the world
and that become manifested in various ways in social and political life.
The Philosophy of Right
In 1821, Hegel's Philosophy of Right orginally appeared under the
double title Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaften in Grundrisse; Grundlinien
der Philosophie des Rechts (Natural Law and the Science of the State;
Elements of the Philosophy of Right). The work was republished by Eduard Gans in
1833 and 1854 as part of Hegel's Werke, vol. viii and included additions from
notes taken by students at Hegel's lectures. The English language translation of
this work by T. M. Knox refers to these later editions as well as to an
edition published in 1923 by Georg Lasson, which included corrections from
previous editions. The Philosophy of Right constitutes, along with Hegel's Philosophy of
History, the penultimate section of his Encyclopedia, the section on
Objective Spirit, which deals with the human world and its array of social rules
and institutions, including the moral, legal, religious, economic, and political
as well as marriage, the family, social classes, and other forms of human
organization. The German word Recht is often translated as 'law',
however, Hegel clearly intends the term to have a broader meaning that captures
what we might call the good or just society, one that is "rightful" in its
structure, composition, and practices. In the Introduction to this work Hegel explains the concept of his
philosophical undertaking along with the specific key concepts of will, freedom,
and right. At the very beginning, Hegel states that the Idea of right, the
concept together with its actualization, is the proper subject of the
philosophical science of right (¶ 1). Hegel is emphatic that the study is
scientific in that it deals in a systematic way with something essentially
rational. He further remarks that the basis of scientific procedure in a
philosophy of right is explicated in philosophical logic and presupposed by the
former (¶ 2). Furthermore, Hegel is at pains to distinguish the historical
or legal approach to "positive law" (Gesetz) and the philosophical
approach to the Idea of right (Recht), the former involving mere
description and compilation of laws as legal facts while the latter probes into
the inner meaning and necessary determinations of law or right. For Hegel the
justification of something, the finding of its inherent rationality, is not a
matter of seeking its origins or longstanding features but rather of studying it
conceptually. However, there is one sense in which the origin of right is relevant to
philosophical science and this is the free will. The free will is the basis and
origin of right in the sense that mind or spirit (Geist) generally
objectifies itself in a system of right (human social and political
institutions) that gives expression to freedom, which Hegel says is both the
substance and goal of right (¶ 4). This ethical life in the state consists
in the unity of the universal and the subjective will. The universal will is
contained in the Idea of freedom as its essence, but when considered apart from
the subjective will can be thought of only abstractly or indeterminately.
Considered apart from the subjective or particular will, the universal will is
"the element of pure indeterminacy or that pure reflection of the ego into
itself which involves the dissipation of every restriction and every content
either immediately presented by nature, by needs, desires, and impulses, or
given and determined by any means whatever" (¶ 5). In other words, the
universal will is that moment in the Idea of freedom where willing is thought of
as state of absolutely unrestrained volition, unfettered by any particular
circumstances or limitations whatsoeverthe pure form of willing. This is
expressed in the modern libertarian view of completely uncoerced choice, the
absence of restraint (or "negative liberty" as understood by Thomas Hobbes).
The subjective will, on the other hand, is the principle of activity and
realization that involves "differentiation, determination, and positing of a
determinacy as a content and object" (¶ 6). This means that the will is
not merely unrestrained in acting but that it actually can give expression to the
doing or accomplishing of certain things, e.g., through talent or expertise
(sometimes called "positive freedom"). The unity of both the moments of
abstract universality (the will in-itself) and subjectivity or particularity (the
will for-itself) is the concrete universal or true individuality (the will
in-and-for-itself). According to Hegel, preservation of the distinction of these
two moments in the unity (identity-in-difference) between universal and
particular will is what produces rational self-determination of an ego, as well
as the self-consciousness of the state as a whole. Hegel's conception of freedom
as self-determination is just this unity in difference of the universal and
subjective will, be it in the willing by individual persons or in the expressions
of will by groups of individuals or collectivities. The "negative
self-relation" of this freedom involves the subordination of the natural
instincts, impulses, and desires to conscious reflection and to goals and
purposes that are consciously chosen and that require commitment to rational
principles in order to properly guide action. The overall structure of the Philosophy of Right is quite remarkable in
its "syllogistic" organization. The main division of the work corresponds to
what Hegel calls the stages in the development of "the Idea of the absolutely
free will," and these are Abstract Right, Morality, and Ethical Life. Each of
these divisions is further subdivided triadically: under Abstract Right there is
Property, Contract, and Wrong; under Morality falls Purpose and Responsibility,
Intention and Welfare, and Good and Conscience; finally, under Ethical Life comes
the Family, Civil Society, and the State. These last subdivisions are further
subdivided into triads, with fourth level subdivisions occurring under Civil
Society and the State. This triadic system of rubrics is no mere description of
a static model of social and political life. Hegel claims that it gives
expression to the conceptual development of Spirit in human society based upon
the purely logical development of rationality provided in his Logic.
Thus, it is speculatively based and not derivable from empirical survey, although
the particularities of the system do indeed correspond to our experience and what
we know about ourselves anthropologically, culturally, etc. The transition in the Logic from universality to particularity to
individuality (or concrete universality) is expressed in the social and political
context in the conceptual transition from Abstract Right to Morality to Ethical
Life. In the realm of Abstract Right, the will remains in its immediacy as an
abstract universal that is expressed in personality and in the universal right
to possession of external things in property. In the realm of Morality, the
will is no longer merely "in-itself," or restricted to the specific
characteristics of legal personality, but becomes free "for-itself," i.e., it is
will reflected into itself so as to produce a self-consciousness of the will's
infinity. The will is expressed, initially, in inner conviction and subsequently
in purpose, intention, and conviction. As opposed to the merely juridical
person, the moral agent places primary value on subjective recognition of
principles or ideals that stand higher than positive law. At this stage,
universality of a higher moral law is viewed as something inherently different
from subjectivity, from the will's inward convictions and actions, and so in its
isolation from a system of objectively recognized legal rules the willing subject
remains "abstract, restricted, and formal" (¶ 108). Because the subject
is intrinsically a social being who needs association with others in order to
institutionalize the universal maxims of morality, maxims that cover all people,
it is only in the realm of Ethical Life that the universal and the subjective
will come into a unity through the objectification of the will in the
institutions of the Family, Civil Society, and the State. In what follows, we trace through Hegel's systematic development of the
"stages of the will," highlighting only the most important points as necessary to
get an overall view of this work.
Abstract Right
The subject of Abstract Right (Recht) is the person as the bearer or
holder of individual rights. Hegel claims that this focus on the right of
personality, while significant in distinguishing persons from mere things, is
abstract and without content, a simple relation of the will to itself. The
imperative of right is: "Be a person and respect others as persons" (¶
36). In this formal conception of right, there is no question of particular
interests, advantages, motives or intentions, but only the mere idea of the
possibility of choosing based on the having of permission, as long as one does
not infringe on the right of other persons. Because of the possibilities of
infringement, the positive form of commands in this sphere are prohibitions. (1) Property (the universality of will as embodied in things) A person must translate his or her freedom into the external world "in order
to exist as Idea" (¶ 41), thus abstract right manifests itself in the
absolute right of appropriation over all things. Property is the category
through which one becomes an object to oneself in that one actualizes the will
through possession of something external. Property is the embodiment of
personality and of freedom. Not only can a person put his or her will into
something external through the taking possession of it and of using it, but one
can also alienate property or yield it to the will of another, including the
ability to labor for a restricted period of time. One's personality is
inalienable and one's right to personality imprescriptible. This means one
cannot alienate all of one's labor time without becoming the property of another.
(2) Contract (the positing of explicit universality of will) In this sphere, we have a relation of will to will, i.e., one holds property
not merely by means of the subjective will externalized in a thing, but by means
of another's person's will, and implicitly by virtue of one's participation in a
common will. The status of being an independent owner of something from which
one excludes the will of another is thus mediated in the identification of one's
will with the other in the contractual relation, which presupposes that the
contracting parties "recognize each other as persons and property owners" (¶
71). (Note the significant development here beyond the dialectic of lord and
bondsman.) Moreover, when contract involves the alienation or giving up of
property, the external thing is now an explicit embodiment of the unity of wills.
In contractual relations of exchange, what remains identical as the property of
the individuals is its value, in respect to which the parties to the contract are
on an equal footing, regardless of the qualitative external differences between
the things exchanged. "Value is the universal in which the subjects of the
contract participate" (¶ 77). (3) Wrong (the particular will opposing itself to the universal) In immediate relations of persons to one another it is possible for a
particular will to be at variance with the universal through arbitrariness of
decision and contingency of circumstance, and so the appearance
(Erscheinung) of right takes on the character of a show (Schein),
which is the inessential, arbitrary, posing as the essential. If the "show" is
only implicit and not explicit also, i.e., if the wrong passes in the doer's
eyes as right, the wrong is non-malicious. In fraud a show is made to deceive
the other party and so in the doer's eyes the right asserted is only a show.
Crime is wrong both in itself and from the doer's point of view, such that wrong
is willed without even the pretense or show of right. Here the form of acting
does not imply a recognition of right but rather is an act of coercion through
exercise of force. It is a "negatively infinite judgement" in that it asserts a
denial of rights to the victim, which is not only incompatible with the fact of
the matter but also self-negating in denying its own capacity for rights in
principle. The penalty that falls on the criminal is not merely just but is "a right
established within the criminal himself, i.e., in his objectively embodied
will, in his action," because the crime as the action of a rational being
implies appeal to a universal standard recognized by the criminal (¶ 100).
The annulling of crime in this sphere of immediate right occurs first as revenge,
which as retributive is just in its content, but in its form it is an act of a
subjective will and does not correspond with its universal content and hence as a
new transgression is defective and contradictory (¶ 102). All crimes are
comparable in their universal property of being injuries, thus, in a sense it is
not something personal but the concept itself which carries out retribution. Crime, as the will which is implicitly null, contains its negation in itself,
which is its punishment. The nullity of crime is that it has set aside
right as such, but since right is absolute it cannot be set aside. Thus, the act
of crime is not something positive, not a first thing, but is something
negative, and punishment is the negation of crime's negation.
Morality
The demand for justice as punishment rather than as revenge, with regard to
wrong, implies the demand for a will which, though particular and subjective,
also wills the universal as such. In wrong the will has become aware of itself
as particular and has opposed itself to and contradicted the universal embodied
in rights. At this stage the universally right is abstract and one-sided and
thus requires a move to a higher level of self-consciousness where the
universally right is mediated by the particular convictions of the willing
subject. We go beyond the criminal's defiance of the universal by substituting
for the abstract conception of personality the more concrete conception of
subjectivity. The criminal is now viewed as breaking his own law, and his crime
is a self-contradiction and not only a contradiction of a right outside him.
This recognition brings us to the level of morality (Moralität) where
the will is free both in itself and for itself, i.e., the will is self-conscious
of its subjective freedom. At the level of morality the right of the subjective will is embodied in
immediate wills (as opposed to immediate things like property). The defect of
this level, however, is that the subject is only for itself, i.e., one is
conscious of one's subjectivity and independence but is conscious of
universality only as something different from this subjectivity. Therefore, the
identity of the particular will and the universal will is only implicit and the
moral point of view is that of a relation of "ought-to-be," or the demand for
what is right. While the moral will externalizes itself in action, its
self-determination is a pure "restlessness" of activity that never arrives at
actualization. The right of the moral will has three aspects. First, there is the right of
the will to act in its external environment, to recognize as its actions only
those that it has consciously willed in light of an aim or purpose (purpose and
responsibility). Second, in my intention I ought to be aware not simply of my
particular action but also of the universal which is conjoined with it. The
universal is what I have willed and is my intention. The right of intention is
that the universal quality of the action is not merely implied but is known by
the agent, and so it lies from the start in one's subjective will. Moreover, the
content of such a will is not only the right of the particular subject to be
satisfied but is elevated to a universal end, the end of welfare or happiness
(intention and welfare). The welfare of many unspecified persons is thus also an
essential end and right of subjectivity. However, right as an abstract
universal and welfare as abstract particularity, may collide, since both are
contingent on circumstances for their satisfaction, e.g., in cases where claims
of right or welfare by someone may endanger the life of another there can be a
counter-claim to a right of distress. "This distress reveals the finitude and
therefore the contingency of both right and welfare" (¶ 128). This
"contradiction" between right and welfare is overcome in the third aspect of the
moral will, the good which is "the Idea as the unity of the concept of the will
with the particular will" (¶ 129). In addition to the right of the subjective will that whatever it recognizes as
valid shall be seen by it as good, and that an action shall be imputed to it as
good or evil in accordance with its knowledge of the worth which the action has
in its external objectivity (¶ 132), which together constitute a "right of
insight," the will also must recognize the good as its duty, which is, to
begin with, duty for duty's sake, or duty formally and without content (e.g.,
as expressed in the Kantian "categorical imperative"). Because of this lack of
content, the subjective will in its abstract reflection into itself is "absolute
inward certainty (Gewißheit) of self," or conscience (Gewissen).
While true or authentic conscience is the disposition to will what is absolutely
good, and thus correspond with what is objectively right, purely formal
conscience lacks an objective system of principles and duties. Although
conscience is ideally supposed to mean the identity of subjective knowing and
willing with the truly good, when it remains the subjective inner reflection of
self-consciousness into itself its claim to this identity is deficient and
one-sided. Moreover, when the determinate character of right and duty reduces to
subjectivity, the mere inwardness of the will, there is the potentiality of
elevating the self-will of particular individuals above the universal itself,
i.e., of "slipping into evil" (¶ 139). What makes a person evil is the
choosing of natural desires in opposition to the good, i.e., to the concept of
the will. When an individual attempts to pass off his or her action as good, and
thus imposing it on others, while being aware of the discrepancy between its
negative character and the objective universal good, the person falls into
hypocrisy. This is one of several forms of perverse moral subjectivity that
Hegel discusses at length in his remarks (¶ 140).
Ethical Life
Hegel's analysis of the moral implications of "good and conscience" leads to
the conclusion that a concrete unity of the objective good with the subjectivity
of the will cannot be achieved at the level of personal morality since all
attempts at this are problematic. The concrete identity of the good with the
subjective will occurs only in moving to the level of ethical life
(Sittlichkeit), which Hegel says is "the Idea of freedom
the concept
of freedom developed into the existing world and the nature of
self-consciousness" (¶ 142). Thus, ethical life is permeated with both
objectivity and subjectivity: regarded objectively it is the state and its
institutions, whose force (unlike abstract right) depends entirely on the
self-consciousness of citizens, on their subjective freedom; regarded
subjectively it is the ethical will of the individual which (unlike the moral
will) is aware of objective duties that express one's inner sense of universality.
The rationality of the ethical order of society is thus constituted in the
synthesis of the concept of the will, both as universal and as particular, with
its embodiment in institutional life. The synthesis of ethical life means that individuals not only act in
conformity with the ethical good but that they recognize the authority of ethical
laws. This authority is not something alien to individuals since they are linked
to the ethical order through a strong identification which Hegel says "is more
like an identity than even the relation of faith or trust" (¶ 147). The
knowledge of how the laws and institutions of society are binding on the will of
individuals entails a "doctrine of duties." In duty the individual finds
liberation both from dependence on mere natural impulse, which may or may not
motivate ethical actions, and from indeterminate subjectivity which cannot
produce a clear view of proper action. "In duty the individual acquires his
substantive freedom" (¶ 149). In the performance of duty the individual
exhibits virtue when the ethical order is reflected in his or her character, and
when this is done by simple conformity with one's duties it is rectitude. When
individuals are simply identified with the actual ethical order such that their
ethical practices are habitual and second nature, ethical life appears in their
general mode of conduct as custom (Sitten). Thus, the ethical order
manifests its right and validity vis-à-vis individuals. In duty "the self-will
of the individual vanishes together with his private conscience which had claimed
independence and opposed itself to the ethical substance. For when his character
is ethical, he recognizes as the end which moves him to act the universal which
is itself unmoved but is disclosed in its specific determinations as rationality
actualized. He knows that his own dignity and the whole stability of his
particular ends are grounded in this same universal, and it is therein that he
actually attains these" (¶ 152). However, this does not deny the right of
subjectivity, i.e., the right of individuals to be satisfied in their particular
pursuits and free activity; but this right is realized only in belonging to an
objective ethical order. The "bond of duty" will be seen as a restriction on the
particular individual only if the self-will of subjective freedom is considered
in the abstract, apart from an ethical order (as is the case for both Abstract
Right and Morality). "Hence, in this identity of the universal will with the
particular will, right and duty coalesce, and by being in the ethical order a man
has rights in so far as he has duties, and duties in so far as he has rights"
(¶ 155). In the realm of ethical life the logical syllogism of self-determination of
the Idea is most clearly applied. The moments of universality, particularity,
and individuality initially are represented respectively in the institutions of
the family, civil society, and the state. The family is "ethical mind in its
natural or immediate phase" and is characterized by love or the feeling of unity
in which one is not conscious of oneself as an independent person but only as a
member of the family unit to which one is bound. Civil society, on the other
hand, comprises an association of individuals considered as self-subsistent and
who have no conscious sense of unity of membership but only pursue
self-interest, e.g., in satisfying needs, acquiring and protecting property, and
in joining organizations for mutual advantage. Finally, the constitution of the
political state brings together in a unity the sense of the importance of the
whole or universal good along with the freedom of particularity of individual
pursuits and thus is "the end and actuality of both the substantial order and the
public life devoted thereto" (¶ 157).
The Family
The family is characterized by love which is "mind's feeling of its own
unity," where one's sense of individuality is within this unity, not as an
independent individual but as a member essentially related to the other family
members. Thus, familial love implies a contradiction between, on the one hand,
not wanting to be a self-subsistent and independent person if that means feeling
incomplete and, on the other hand, wanting to be recognized in another person.
Familial love is truly an ethical unity, but because it is nonetheless a
subjective feeling it is limited in sustaining unity (pars. 158-59, and
additions). (A) Marriage The union of man and woman in marriage is both natural and spiritual, i.e., is
a physical relationship and one that is also self-conscious, and it is entered
into on the basis of the free consent of the persons. Since this consent
involves bringing two persons into a union, there is the mutual surrender of
their natural individuality for the sake of union, which is both a
self-restriction and also a liberation because in this way individuals attain a
higher self-consciousness. (B) Family Capital The family as a unit has its external existence in property, specifically
capital (Vermögen) which constitutes permanent and secured
possessions that allow for endurance of the family as "person" (¶ 170).
This capital is the common property of all the family members, none of whom
possess property of their own, but it is administered by the head of the family,
the husband. (C) Education of Children & Dissolution of the Family Children provide the external and objective basis for the unity of marriage.
The love of the parents for their children is the explicit expression of their
love for each other, while their immediate feelings of love for each other are
only subjective. Children have the right to maintenance and education, and in
this regard a claim upon the family capital, but parents have the right to
provide this service to the children and to instill discipline over the wishes of
their children. The education of children has a twofold purpose: the positive aim
of instilling ethical principles in them in the form of immediate feeling and the
negative one of raising them out of the instinctive physical level. Marriage can
be dissolved not by whim but by duly constituted authority when there is total
estrangement of husband and wife. The ethical dissolution of the family results
when the children have been educated to be free and responsible persons and they
are of mature age under the law. The natural dissolution of the family occurs
with the death of the parents, the result of which is the passing of inheritance
of property to the surviving family members. The disintegration of the family
exhibits its immediacy and contingency as an expression of the ethical Idea
(pars. 173-80).
Civil Society
With civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) we move from the
family or "the ethical idea still in its concept," where consciousness of the
whole or totality is focal, to the "determination of particularity," where the
satisfaction of subjective needs and desires is given free reign (pars. 181-182).
However, despite the pursuit of private or selfish ends in relatively
unrestricted social and economic activity, universality is implicit in the
differentiation of particular needs insofar as the welfare of an individual in
society is intrinsically bound up with that of others, since each requires
another in some way to effectively engage in reciprocal activities like commerce,
trade, etc. Because this system of interdependence is not self-conscious but
exists only in abstraction from the individual pursuit of need satisfaction, here
particularity and universality are only externally related. Hegel says that
"this system may be prima facie regarded as the external state, the state based
on need, the state as the Understanding (Verstand) envisages it" (¶
183). However, civil society is also a realm of mediation of particular wills
through social interaction and a means whereby individuals are educated
(Bildung) through their efforts and struggles toward a higher universal
consciousness. (A) The System of Needs This dimension of civil society involves the pursuit of need satisfaction.
Humans are different from animals in their ability to multiply needs and
differentiate them in various ways, which leads to their refinement and luxury.
Political economy discovers the necessary interconnections in the social and
universalistic side of need. Work is the mode of acquisition and transformation
of the means for satisfying needs as well as a mode of practical education in
abilities and understanding. Work also reveals the way in which people are
dependent upon one another in their self-seeking and how each individual
contributes to the need satisfaction of all others. Society generates a
"universal permanent capital" (¶ 199) that everyone in principle can draw
upon, but the natural inequalities between individuals will translate into social
inequalities. Furthermore, labor undergoes a division according to the
complexities of the system of production, which is reflected in social class
divisions: the agricultural (substantial or immediate); the business
(reflecting or formal); and the civil servants (universal). Membership in a
class is important for gaining status and recognition in a civil society. Hegel
says that "A man actualizes himself only in becoming something definite, i.e.,
something specifically particularized; this means restricting himself exclusively
to one of the particular spheres of need. In this class-system, the ethical
frame of mind therefore is rectitude and esprit de corps, i.e., the
disposition to make oneself a member of one of the moments of civil society by
one's own act
in this way gaining recognition both in one's own eyes and in
the eyes of others" (¶ 207). The "substantial" agricultural class is based upon family relationships whose
capital is in the products of nature, such as the land, and tends to be
patriarchial, unreflective, and oriented toward dependence rather than free
activity. In contrast to this focus on "immediacy," the business class is
oriented toward work and reflection, e.g., in transforming raw materials for use
and exchange, which is a form of mediation of humans to one another. The main
activities of the business class are craftsmanship, manufacture, and trade. The
third class is the class of civil servants, which Hegel calls the "universal
class" because it has the universal interests of society as its concern. Members
of this class are relieved from having to labor to support themselves and
maintain their livelihood either from private resources such as inheritance or
are paid a salary by the state as members of the bureaucracy. These individuals
tend to be highly educated and must qualify for appointment to government
positions on the basis of merit. (B) Administration of Justice The principle of rightness becomes civil law (Gesetz) when it is
posited, and in order to have binding force it must be given determinate objective
existence. To be determinately existent, laws must be made universally known
through a public legal code. Through a rational legal system, private property
and personality are given legal recognition and validity in civil society, and
wrongdoing now becomes an infringement, not merely of the subjective right of
individuals but also of the larger universal will that exists in ethical life. The
court of justice is the means whereby right is vindicated as something universal
by addressing particular cases of violation or conflict without mere subjective
feeling or private bias. "Instead of the injured party, the injured
universal now comes on the scene, and
this pursuit consequently
ceases to be the subjective and contingent retribution of revenge and is
transformed into the genuine reconciliation of right with itself, i.e, into
punishment" (¶ 220). Moreover, court proceedings and legal processes
must take place according to rights and rules of evidence; judicial proceedings
as well as the laws themselves must be made public; trial should be by jury; and
punishment should fit the crime. Finally, in the administration of justice,
"civil society returns to its concept, to the unity of the implicit universal
with the subjective particular, although here the latter is only that present in
single cases and the universality in question is that of abstract right"
(¶ 229). (C) The Police and the Corporation The Police (Polizei) for Hegel is understood broadly as the public
authorities in civil society. In addition to crime fighting organizations, it
includes agencies that provide oversight over public utilities as well as
regulation of and, when necessary, intervention into activities related to the
production, distribution, and sale of goods and services, or with any of the
contingencies that can affect the rights and welfare of individuals and society
generally (e.g., defense of the public's right not to be defrauded, and also
the management of goods inspection). Also, the public authority superintends
education and organizes the relief of poverty. Poverty must be addressed both
through private charity and public assistance since in civil society it
constitutes a social wrong when poverty results in the creation of a class of
"penurious rabble" (¶ 245). Society looks to colonization to increase its wealth but
poverty remains a problem with no apparent solution. The corporation (Korporation) applies especially to the business class,
since this class is concentrated on the particularities of social existence and
the corporation has the function of bringing implicit similarities between
various private interests into explicit existence in forms of association. This
is not the same as our contemporary business corporation but rather is a
voluntary association of persons based on occupational or various social
interests (such as professional and trade guilds, educational clubs, religious
societies, townships, etc.) Because of the integrating function of the
corporation, especially in regard to the social and economic division of labor,
what appear as selfish purposes in civil society are shown to be at the same time
universal through the formation of concretely recognized commonalities. Hegel
says that "a Corporation has the right, under the surveillance of the public
authority, (a) to look after its own interests within its own sphere, (b) to
co-opt members, qualified objectively by requisite skill and rectitude, to a
number fixed by the general structure of society, (c) to protect its members
against particular contingencies, (d) to provide the education requisite to fit
other to become members. In short, the right is to come on the scene like a
second family for its members
" (¶ 252). Furthermore, the family is
assured greater stability of livelihood insofar as its providers are corporation
members who command the respect due to them in their social positions. "Unless
he is a member of an authorized Corporation (and it is only by being authorized
that an association becomes a Corporation), an individual is without rank or
dignity, his isolation reduces his business to mere self-seeking, and his
livelihood and satisfaction become insecure" (¶ 253). Because individual
self-seeking is raised to a higher level of common pursuits, albeit restricted to
the interest of a sectional group, individual self-consciousness is raised to
relative universality. Hence, "As the family was the first, so the Corporation is
the second ethical root of the state, the one planted in civil society" (¶
255).
The State
The political State, as the third moment of Ethical Life, provides a synthesis
between the principles governing the Family and those governing Civil Society.
The rationality of the state is located in the realization of the universal
substantial will in the self-consciousness of particular individuals elevated to
consciousness of universality. Freedom becomes explicit and objective in this
sphere. "Since the state is mind objectified, it is only as one of its members
that the individual has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical
life
and the individual's destiny is the living of a universal life" (¶
258). Rationality is concrete in the state in so far as its content is comprised
in the unity of objective freedom (freedom of the universal or substantial will)
and subjective freedom (freedom of everyone in knowing and willing of particular
ends); and in its form rationality is in self-determining action or laws and
principles which are logical universal thoughts (as in the logical
syllogism). The Idea of the State is itself divided into three moments: (a) the immediate
actuality of the state as a self-dependent organism, or Constitutional Law; (b)
the relation of states to other states in International Law; (c) the universal
Idea as Mind or Spirit which gives itself actuality in the process of
World-History.
Constitutional Law
(1) The Constitution (internally) Only through the political constitution of the State can universality and
particularity be welded together into a real unity. The self-consciousness of
this unity is expressed in the recognition on the part of each citizen that the
full meaning of one's actual freedom is found in the objective laws and
institutions provided by the State. The aspect of identity comes to the fore in
the recognition that individual citizens give to the ethical laws such that they
"do not live as private persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act of
willing these they will the universal in the light of the universal, and their
activity is consciously aimed at none but the universal end" (¶ 260). The
aspect of differentiation, on the other hand, is found in "the right of
individuals to their particular satisfaction," the right of subjective freedom
which is maintained in Civil Society. Thus, according to Hegel, "the universal
must be furthered, but subjectivity on the other hand must attain its full and
living development. It is only when both these moments subsist in their
strength that the state can be regarded as articulated and genuinely organized"
(¶ 260, addition). As was indicated in the introduction to the concept of Ethical Life above, the
higher authority of the laws and institutions of society requires a doctrine of
duties. From the vantage point of the political State, this means that there
must be a correlation between rights and duties. "In the state, as something
ethical, as the inter-penetration of the substantive and the particular, my
obligation to what is substantive is at the same time the embodiment of my
particular freedom. This means that in the state duty and right are united in
one and the same relation" (¶ 261). In fulfilling one's duties one is also
satisfying particular interests, and the conviction that this is so Hegel calls
"political sentiment" (politische Gesinnung) or patriotism. "This
sentiment is, in general, trust (which may pass over into a greater or lesser
degree of educated insight), or the consciousness that my interest, both
substantive and particular, is contained and preserved in another's (i.e., the
state's) interest and end, i.e., in the other's relation to me as an individual"
(¶ 268). Thus, the "bond of duty" cannot involve being coerced into
obeying the laws of the State. "Commonplace thinking often has the impression
that force holds the state together, but in fact its only bond is the sense of
order which everybody possesses" (¶ 268, addition). According to Hegel, the political state is rational in so far as it inwardly
differentiates itself according to the nature of the Concept (Begriff).
The principle of the division of powers expresses inner differentiation, but
while these powers are distinguished they must also be built into an organic
whole such that each contains in itself the other moments so that the political
constitution is a concrete unity in difference. Constitutional Law is
accordingly divided into three moments: (a) the Legislature which establishes the
universal through lawmaking; (b) the Executive which subsumes the particular
under the universal through administering the laws; (c) the Crown which is the
power of subjectivity of the state in the providing of the act of "ultimate
decision" and thus forming into unity the other two powers. Despite the
syllogistic sequence of universality, particularity, and individuality in these
three constitutional powers, Hegel discusses the Crown first followed by the
Executive and the Legislature respectively. Hegel understands the concept of the
Crown in terms of constitutional monarchy. (a) The Crown "The power of the crown contains in itself the three moments of the whole,
viz., (a) the universality of the constitution
and the laws; (b) counsel, which refers the
particular to the universal; and (g) the moment
of ultimate decision, as the self-determination to which everything else
reverts and from which everything else derives the beginning of its actuality"
(¶ 275). The third moment is what gives expression to the sovereignty of
the state, i.e., that the various activities, agencies, functions and powers of
the state are not self-subsistent but rather have their basis ultimately in the
unity of the state as a single self or self-organized organic whole. The monarch
is the bearer of the individuality of the state and its sovereignty is the
ideality in unity in which the particular functions and powers of the state
subsist. "It is only as a person, the monarch, that the personality of the
state is actual. Personality expresses the concept as such; but the person
enshrines the actuality of the concept, and only when the concept is determined
as a person is it the Idea or truth" (¶ 279). The monarch is not a despot but rather a constitutional monarch, and he does
not act in a capricious manner but is bound by a decision-making process, in
particular to the recommendations and decisions of his cabinet (supreme advisory
council). The monarch functions solely to give agency to the state, and so his
personal traits are irrelevant and his ascending to the throne is based on
hereditary succession, and thus on the accident of birth. "In a completely
organized state, it is only a question of the culminating point of formal
decision
he has only to say 'yes' and dot the 'i'
. In a well organized
monarchy, the objective aspect belongs to law alone, and the monarch's part is
merely to set to the law the subjective 'I will'" (¶ 280, addition). The
"majesty of the monarch" lies in the free asserting of 'I will' as an expression
of the unity of the state and the final step in establishing law. (b) The Executive The executive has the task of executing and applying the decisions formally
made by the monarch. "This task of merely subsuming the particular under the
universal is comprised in the executive power, which also includes the powers
of the judiciary and the police" (¶ 287). Also, the executive is the
higher authority that oversees the filling of positions of responsibilities in
corporations. The executive is comprised of the civil servants proper and the
higher advisory officials organized into committees, both of which are connected
to the monarch through their supreme departmental heads. Overall, government has
its division of labor into various centers of administration managed by special
officials. Individuals are appointed to executive functions on the basis of
their knowledgibility and proof of ability and tenure is conditional on the
fulfillment of duties, with the offices in the civil service being open to all
citizens. The executive is not an unchecked bureaucratic authority. "The security of
the state and its subjects against the misuse of power by ministers and their
officials lies directly in their hierarchical organization and their
answerability; but it lies too in the authority given to societies and
corporations
" (¶ 295). However, civil servants will tend to be
dispassionate, upright, and polite in part as "a result of direct education in
thought and ethical conduct" (¶ 296). Civil servants and the members of the
executive make up the largest section of the middle class, the class with a
highly developed intelligence and consciousness of right. Moreover, "The
sovereign working on the middle class at the top, and Corporation-rights
working on it at the bottom, are the institutions which effectively prevent it
from acquiring the isolated position of an aristocracy and using its education
and skill as a means to an arbitrary tyranny" (¶ 297). (c) The Legislature For Hegel, "The legislature is concerned (a) with the laws as such in so far
as they require fresh and extended determination; and (b) with the content of
home affairs affecting the entire state" (¶ 298). Legislative activity
focuses on both providing well-being and happiness for citizens as well as
exacting services from them (largely in the form of monetary taxes). The proper
function of legislation is distinguished from the function of administration
and state regulation in that the content of the former are determinate laws that
are wholly universal whereas in administration it is application of the law to
particulars, along with enforcing the law. Hegel also says that the other two
moments of the political constitution, the monarchy and the executive, are the
first two moments of the legislature, i.e., are reflected in the legislature
respectively through the ultimate decision regarding proposed laws and an
advising function in their formation. Hegel rejects the idea of independence or
separation of powers for the sake of checks and balances, which he holds destroys
the unity of the state (¶ 300, addition). The third moment in the
legislature is the estates (Stände), which are the classes of society
given political recognition in the legislature. In the legislature, the estates "have the function of bringing public affairs
into existence not only implicitly, but also actually, i.e., of bringing into
existence the moment of subjective formal freedom, the public consciousness as an
empirical universal, of which the thoughts and opinions of the Many are
particulars" (¶ 301). Not only do the estates guarantee the general welfare
and public freedom, but they are also the means by which the state as a whole
enters the subjective consciousness of the people through their participation in
the state. Thus, the estates incorporate the private judgment and will of
individuals in civil society and give it political significance. The estates have an important integrating function in the state overall.
"Regarded as a mediating organ, the Estates stand between the government in
general on the one hand, and the nation broken up into particulars (people and
associations) on the other.
[I]n common with the organized executive, they are a
middle term preventing both the extreme isolation of the power of the crown
and also the isolation of the particular interests of persons, societies and
Corporations" (¶ 302). Also, the organizing function of the estates
prevents groups in society from becoming formless masses that could form
anti-government feelings and rise up in blocs in opposition to the state. The three classes of civil society, the agricultural, the business, and the
universal class of civil servants, are each given political voice in the Estates
Assembly in accordance with their distinctiveness in the lower spheres of civil
life. The legislature is divided into two houses, an upper and lower. The upper
house comprises the agricultural estate (including the peasant farmers and landed
aristocracy), a class "whose ethical life is natural, whose basis is family
life, and, so far as its livelihood is concerned, the possession of land. Its
particular members attain their position by birth, just as the monarch does, and,
in common with him, they possess a will which rests on itself alone" (¶
305). Landed gentry inherit their estates and so owe their position to birth
(primogeniture) and thus are free from the exigencies and uncertainties of the
life of business and state interference. The relative independence of this class
makes it particularly suited for public office as well as a mediating element
between the crown and civil society. The second section of the estates, the business class, comprises the
"fluctuating and changeable element in civil society" which can enter politics only through its
deputies or representatives (unlike the agricultural estate from which members
can present themselves to the Estates Assembly in person). The appointment of
deputies is "made by society as a society" both because of the multiplicity of
members but also because representation must reflect the organization of civil
society into associations, communities, and corporations. It is only as a member
of such groups that an individual is a member of the state, and hence rational
representation implies that consent to legislation is to be given not directly by
all but only by "plenipotentiaries" who are chosen on the basis of their
understanding of public affairs as well as managerial and political acumen,
character, insight, etc. Moreover, their charge is to further the general
interest of society and not the interest of a particular association or
corporation instead (¶ 308-10). The deputies of civil society are selected by the various corporations, not on
the basis of universal direct suffrage which Hegel believed inevitably leads to
electoral indifference, and they adopt the point of view of society. "Deputies
are sometimes regarded as 'representatives'; but they are representatives in an
organic, rational sense only if they are representatives not of individuals or a
conglomeration of them, but of one of the essential spheres of society and its
large-scale interests. Hence, representation cannot now be taken to mean
simply the substitution of one man for another; the point is that the interest
itself is actually present in its representative, while he himself is there to
represent the objective element of his own being" (¶ 311). The debates that take place in the Estates Assembly are to be open to the
public, whereby citizens can become politically educated both about national
affairs and the true character of their own interests. "The formal subjective
freedom of individuals consists in their having and expressing their own private
judgements, opinions, and recommendations as affairs of state. This freedom is
collectively manifested as what is called 'public opinion', in which what is
absolutely universal, the substantive and the true, is linked with its opposite,
the purely particular and private opinions of the Many" (¶ 316). Public
opinion is a "standing self-contradiction" because, on the one hand, it gives
expression to genuine needs and proper tendencies of common life along with
common sense views about important matters and, on the other, is infected with
accidental opinion, ignorance, and faulty judgment. "Public opinion therefore
deserves to be as much respected as despised -- despised for its concrete
expression and for the concrete consciousness it expresses, respected for its
essential basis, a basis which only glimmers more or less dimly in that concrete
expression" (¶ 318). Moreover, while there is freedom of public
communication, freedom of the press is not totally unrestricted as freedom does
not mean absence of all restriction, either in word or deed. Hegel calls the class of civil servants the "universal class" not only because
as members of the executive their function is to "subsume the particular under
the universal" in the administration of law, but also because they reflect a
disposition of mind (due perhaps largely from their education) that transcends
concerns with selfish ends in the devotion to the discharge of public functions
and to the public universal good. As one of the classes of the estates, civil
servants also participate in the legislature as an "unofficial class," which
seems to mean that as members of the executive they will attend legislative
assemblies in an advisory capacity, but this is not entirely clear from Hegel's
text. Also, given that the monarch and the classes of civil society when
conceived in abstraction are opposed to each other as "the one and the many,"
they must become "fused into a unity" or mediated together through the
civil servant class. From the point of view of the crown the executive is such a
middle term, because it carries out the final decisions of the crown and makes it
"particularized" in civil society. On the other hand, in order for the classes
of civil society to actually sense this unity with the crown a mediation must
occur from the other direction, so to speak, where the upper house of the
estates, in virtue of certain likenesses to the Crown (e.g., role of birth for
one's position) is able to mediate between the Crown and civil society as a
whole. (2) Sovereignty vis-à-vis foreign States The interpenetration of the universal with the particular will through a
complex system of social and political mediations is what produces the
self-consciousness of the nation-state considered as an organic (internally
differentiated and interrelated) totality or concrete individual. In this
system, particular individuals consciously pursue the universal ends of the
State, not out of external or mechanical conformity to law, but in the free
development of personal individuality and the expression of the unique
subjectivity of each. However, individuality is not something possessed by
particular persons alone, or even primarily by such persons. The state as a
whole, i.e., the nation-state as distinct from the political state as one of its
moments, constitutes a higher form of individuality. In principle, Mind or
Spirit possesses a singleness in its "negative self-relation," i.e., in the sense
that unity in a being is a function of setting itself off from other beings.
"Individuality is awareness of one's existence as a unit in sharp distinction from
others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states,
each of which is autonomous vis-à-vis the others. This autonomy embodies
mind's actual awareness of itself as a unit and hence it is the most fundamental
freedom which a people possesses as well as its highest dignity" (¶ 322).
For any being to have self-conscious independence requires distinguishing the
self from any of its contingent characteristics (inner self-negation), which
externally is a distinction from another being. This consciousness of what one
is not is for the nation-state its negative relation to itself embodied
externally in the world as the relation of one state to another. However, this
is not a mere externality, "But in fact this negative relation is that moment
in the state which is most supremely its own, the state's actual infinity as the
ideality of everything finite within it" (¶ 323). According to Hegel, war is an "ethical moment" in the life of a nation-state
and hence is neither purely accidental nor an inherent evil. Because there is no
higher earthly power ruling over nation-states, and because these entities are
oriented to preserving their existence and sovereignty, conflicts leading to war
are inevitable. Also, defense of one's nation is an ethical duty and the
ultimate test of one's patriotism is war. "Sacrifice on behalf of the
individuality of the state is the substantial tie between the state and all its
members and so is a universal duty" (¶ 325). In making a sacrifice for the
sake of the state individuals prove their courage, which involves a transcendence
of concern with egoistic interests and mere material existence. "The intrinsic
worth of courage as a disposition of mind is to be found in the genuine absolute,
final end, the sovereignty of the state. The work of courage is to actualize
this final end, and the means to this end is the sacrifice of personal actuality"
(¶ 328). Moreover, war, along with catastrophy, disease, etc, highlights
the finitude, insecurity, and ultimate transitoriness of human existence and puts
the health of a state to a test. Hegel does not consider the ideal of "perpetual peace,"
as advocated by Kant, a realistic goal towards which humanity can strive.
Not only is the sovereignty of each state imprescriptible, but any alliance or
league of states will be established in opposition to others.
International Law
"International law springs from the relations between autonomous states. It
is for this reason that what is absolute in it retains the form of an
ought-to-be, since its actuality depends on different wills each of which is
sovereign" (¶ 330). States are not private persons in civil society who
pursue their self-interest in the context of universal interdependence but rather
are completely autonomous entities with no relations of private right or
morality. However, since a state cannot escape having relations with other
states, there must be at least some sort of recognition of each by the other.
International law prescribes that treaties between states ought to be kept, but
this universal proviso remains abstract because the sovereignty of a state is its
guiding principle, hence states are to that extent in a state of nature in
relation to each other (in the Hobbesian sense of there being natural rights to
one's survival with no natural duties to others). "Their rights are actualized
only in their particular wills and not in a universal will with constitutional
powers over them. This universal proviso of international law therefore does
not go beyond an ought-to-be, and what really happens is that international
relations in accordance with treaty alternate with the severance of these
relations" (¶ 333). Obviously, if states come to disagree about the nature
of their treaties, etc., and there is no acceptable compromise for each party,
then matters will ultimately be settled by war. States recognize their own welfare as the highest law governing their
relations to one another, however, the claim by a state to recognition of this
welfare is quite different from claims to welfare by individual person in civil
society. "The ethical substance, the state, has its determinate being, i.e., its
right, directly embodied in something existent
and the principle of its
conduct and behavior can only be this concrete existent and not one of many
universal thoughts supposed to be moral commands" (¶ 337). States recognize
each other as states, and even in war there is awareness of the possibility that
peace can be restored and that therefore war ought to come to an end, as well as
understandings about the proper limitations on the waging of war. However, at
most this translates into the jus gentium, the law of nations understood
as customary relationships, which remains a "maelstrom of external contingency."
The principles of the mind or spirit (Volksgeist) of a nation-state are
wholly restricted because its particularity is already that of realized
individuality, possessing objective actuality and self-consciousness. Hence, the
reciprocal relations of states to one another partake of a "dialectic of
finitude" out of which arises the universal mind, "the mind of the world, free
from all restriction, producing itself as that which exercises its rightand
its right is the highest right of allover these finite minds in the
'history of the world which is the world's court of judgment'" (¶ 340).
World History
To say that history is the world's court of judgment is to say that over and
above the nation-states, or national "spirits," there is the mind or Spirit of
the world (Weltgeist) which pronounces its verdict through the development
of history itself. The verdicts of world history, however, are not expressions
of mere might, which in itself is abstract and non-rational. Rather than blind
destiny, "world history is the necessary development, out of the concepts of
mind's freedom alone, of the moments of reason and so of the self-consciousness
and freedom of mind" (¶ 342). The history of Spirit is the development
through time of its own self-consciousness through the actions of peoples,
states, and world historical actors who, while absorbed in their own interests, are
nonetheless the unconscious instruments of the work of Spirit. "All actions,
including world-historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects
giving actuality to the substantial. They are the living instruments of what is
in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one
with that deed though it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object"
(¶ 348). The actions of great men are produced through their subjective
willing and their passion, but the substance of these deeds is actually the
accomplishment not of the individual agent but of the World Spirit (e.g., the
founding of states by world-historical heroes). Hegel says that in the history of the world we can distinguish several
important formations of the self-consciousness of Spirit in the course of its
free self-development, each corresponding to a significant principle. More
specifically, there are four world-historical epochs, each manifesting a
principle of Spirit as expressed through a dominant culture. In the
Philosophy of Right, Hegel discusses these in a very abbreviated way in
paragraphs 253-260, which brings this work to an end. Here we will draw from the
more elaborated treatment in the appendix to the introduction to Hegel's lectures
on the Philosophy of World History. (1) The Oriental Realm (mind in its immediate substance) Here Spirit exists in its substantiality (objectivity) without inward
differentiation. Individuals have no self-consciousness of personality or of
rightsthey are still immersed in external nature (and their divinities are
naturalistic as well). Hegel characterizes this stage as one of consciousness in
its immediacy, where subjectivity and substantiality are unmediated. In his
Philosophy of History Hegel discusses China, India, and Persia
specifically and suggests that these cultures do not actually have a history but
rather are subject to natural cyclical processes. The typical governments of
these cultures are theocratic and more particularly despotism, aristocracy, and
monarchy respectively. Persia and Egypt are seen as transitional from these
"unhistorical" and "non-political" states. Hegel calls this period the
"childhood" of Spirit. (2) The Greek Realm (mind in the simple unity of subjective and objective) In this realm, we have the mixing of subjective freedom and substantiality in
the ethical life of the Greek polis, because the ancient Greek city-states
give expression to personal individuality for those who are free and have status.
However, the relation of individual to the state is not self-conscious but is
unreflective and based on obedience to custom and tradition. Hence, the
immediate union of subjectivity with the substantial mind is unstable and leads
to fragmentation. This is the period of the "adolescence" of Spirit. (3) The Roman Realm (mind in its abstract universality) At this stage, individual personality is recognized in formal rights, thus
including a level of reflection absent in the Greek realm of "beautiful freedom."
Here freedom is difficult because the universal subjugates individuals,
i.e., the state becomes an abstraction over above its citizens who must be
sacrificed to the severe demands of a state in which individuals form a
homogeneous mass. A tension between the two principles of individuality and
universality ensues, manifesting itself in the formation of political despotism
and insurgency against it. This realm gives expression to the "manhood" of
Spirit. (4) The Germanic Realm (reconciled unity of subjective and objective mind) This realm comprises along with Germany and the Nordic peoples the major
European nations (France, Italy, Spain) along with England. The principle of
subjective freedom comes to the fore in such a way as to be made explicit in the
life of Spirit and also mediated with substantiality. This involves a gradual
development that begins with the rise of Christianity and its spiritual
reconciliation of inner and outer life and culminates in the appearance of the
modern nation-state, the rational Idea of which is articulated in the
Philosophy of Right. (Along the way there are several milestones Hegel
discusses in his Philosophy of History that are especially important in
the developing of the self-consciousness of freedom, in particular the
Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution.) One of the
significant features of the modern world is the overcoming of the antithesis of
church and state that developed in the Medieval period. This final stage of
Spirit is mature "old age." In sum, for Hegel the modern nation-state can be said to manifest a
"personality" and a self-consciousness of its inherent nature and goals, indeed a
self-awareness of everything which is implicit in its concept, and is able to act
rationally and in accordance with its self-awareness. The modern nation-state is
a "spiritual individual," the true historical individual, precisely because of
the level of realization of self-consciousness that it actualizes. The
development of the perfected nation-state is the end or goal of history because
it provides an optimal level of realization of self-consciousness, a more
comprehensive level of realization of freedom than mere natural individuals, or
other forms of human organization, can produce.
Closing Remarks
In closing this account of Hegel's theory of the state, a few words on a
"theory and practice" problem of the modern state. In the preface to the
Philosophy of Right Hegel is quite clear that his science of the state
articulates the nature of the state, not as it ought to be, but as it really is,
as something inherently rational. Hegel's famous quote in this regard is "What
is rational is actual and what is actual is rational," where by the 'actual'
(Wirklich) Hegel means not the merely existent, i.e., a state that can be
simply identified empirically, but the actualized or realized state, i.e., one
that corresponds to its rational concept and thus in some sense must be
perfected. Later in the introduction of the Idea of the state in paragraph 258,
Hegel is at pains to distinguish the Idea of the state from a state understood in
terms of its historical origins and says that while the state is the way of God
in the world we must not focus on particular states or on particular institutions
of the state, but only on the Idea itself. Furthermore he says, "The state is no
ideal work of art; it stands on earth and so in the sphere of caprice, chance,
and error, and bad behavior may disfigure it in many respects. But the ugliest
of men, or a criminal, or an invalid, or a cripple, is still always a living man.
The affirmative, life, subsists despite his defects, and it is this affirmative
factor which is our theme here" (¶ 258, addition). The issue, then, is
whether the actual state -- the subject of philosophical science -- is
only a theoretical possibility and whether from a practical point of view all
existing states are in some way disfigured or deficient. Our ability to
rationally distill from existing states their ideal characteristics does not
entail that a fully actualized state does, or will, exist. Hence, there is perhaps
some ambiguity in Hegel's claim about the modern state as an actualization of freedom.
Bibliography
Works by Hegel in German and in English Translation
Below are works by Hegel that relate most directly to his social and political philosophy. Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse,
Berlin 1830; ed. G. Lasson & O. Pöggler (Hamburg, 1959). In the third
volume of this work, The Philosophy of Spirit, the section on Objective Spirit
corresponds to Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, ed. J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg,
1955. Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 2nd edn.
hrsg. G. Lasson. Leipzig, 1921. This is the most recent edition referred to in
T. M. Knox's translation of 1952. Hegel's Logic, trans. William Wallace. Oxford University Press,
1892. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford University
Press, 1977. Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, trans. William Wallace & A. V. Miller.
Oxford University Press, 1971. Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox. Clarendon Press, 1952;
Oxford University Press, 1967. Hegel's Political Writings, trans. T. M. Knox, with an introductory
essay by Z. A. Pelczynski. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. This contains the
following pieces: "The German Constitution," "On the Recent Domestic Affairs of
Wurtemberg
," "The Proceedings of the Estates Assembly in the Kingdom of
Wurtemberg, 1815-1816," and "The English Reform Bill." Hegels sämtliche Werke, vol. VIII, ed. E. Gans. Berlin: 1833,
1st ed.; 1854, 2nd ed.. These were the first editions of
the material of The Philosophy of Right to incorporate additions culled
from notes taken at Hegel's lectures. T. M. Knox reproduces these in his 1952
translation. Jenaer Realphilosophie I: Die Vorlesungen von 1803/4, ed. J.
Hoffmeister. Leipzig, 1913. Jenaer Realphilosophie II: Die Vorlesungen von 1805/6, ed. J.
Hoffmeister. Hamburg, 1967. Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, trans. H. B.
Nisbet, with an introduction by Duncan Forbes. Cambridge University Press, 1975.
This is based on the 1955 German edition by J. Hoffmeister. Natural Law, trans. T. M. Knox, with an introduction by H. B. Acton.
Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977. Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg: Felix
Meiner, 1952. The Philosophy of History, trans. J. B. Sibree. New York: Dover
Publications Inc., 1956. This is a reprint of the 1899 translation (the first was
done in 1857) of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History, published
by Colonial House Press. The Dover edition has a new introduction by C. J.
Friedrich. Political Writings. Eds. L. Dickie & H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge
Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999. Politische Schriften, Nachwort von Jürgen Habermas.
Frankfurt/Main, 1966. A more recent edition of the material of the Schriften
zur Politik (see below). Reason in History, trans. R. S. Hartman. New York, 1953. The
introduction to Hegel's lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie, 2nd ed. hrsg.
Georg Lasson. Leipzig, 1923. This is the basis of T. M. Knox's translations in
Hegel's Political Writings, 1964. System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit, trans. H. S.
Harris & T. M. Knox. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press,
1979. Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, ed. J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg, 1955.
This is the fourth edition of Hegel's lectures on the Philosophy of World History
given in Berlin from 1822-1830; the previous editions were done by Eduard Gans
(1837), Karl Hegel (1840), and Georg Lasson (1917, 1920, 1930). In the 1930
edition, Lasson added additional manuscript material by Hegel as well as lecture
notes from students, which are preserved in Hoffmeister's edition. Werke. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970. This is the most recent and
comprehensive collection of Hegel's works. His social and political writings are
contained in various volumes.
Works on Hegel's Social and Political Philosophy
The books listed below either focus on one or more aspects of Hegel's social
and political thought or include some discussion in this area and, moreover, are
significant enough works on Hegel to be included. The most comprehensive
bibliography on Hegel is Hegel-Bibliographie (München: K. G Saur
Verlag, 1980). For books and articles in the last 25 years, consult the
Philosopher's Index. Avineri, Shlomo. Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1972. Bosanquet, Bernard. The Philosophical Theory of the State.
4th edition, London: Macmillan, 1930, 1951. Cullen, Bernard. Hegel's Social and Political Thought: An
Introduction. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979. Findlay, John. Hegel: A Re-examination (1958). Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1976. Foster, Michael B. The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935/1968. Dickey, Laurence. Religion, Economics, and the Politics of Spirit.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Franco, Paul. Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2000. Gray, Jesse Glen. Hegel And Greek Thought. New York: Harper &
Row, 1968. Hardimon, Michael O. Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of
Reconciliation. Cambridge University Press, 1994. Harris, H. S. Hegel's Development, vols. 1 & 2. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1972, 1983. Haym, Rudolf. Hegel und seine Zeit. Berlin, 1857; Hildenshine,
1962). Henrich, Dieter & R. P. Horstman. Hegels Philosophie des Rechts.
Stuttgart: Klett-Catta, 1982. Hicks, Steven V. International Law and the Possibility of a Just World
Order: An Essay on Hegel's Universalism. Value Inquiry Book Series 78.
Amsterdam/Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1999. Hyppolite, Jean. Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of
Spirit (1946). Trans. S. Cherniak & J. Heckman. Evanston,
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974. Kainz, Howard P. Hegel's Philosophy of Right with Marx's
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David A. Duquette
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Philosophy
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